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Abstract 
Although the definition and purpose of transitional justice (TJ) does not 
preclude the inclusion of non-state business actors’ involvement in past 
authoritarian state or armed conflict violence, these types human rights 
violations (HRVs) are not included in formal TJ mandates. Nonetheless, in 
practice, TJ processes have included ad hoc measures to hold economic 
actors responsible for those violations. This article seeks to participate in 
the ongoing discussions and design of a UN-initiated proposal for a treaty 
on business and human rights by adding the TJ dimension. It draws on the 
Corporate Accountability and Transitional Justice (CATJ) data base to show 
that TJ initiatives have already incorporated economic actors in the 
investigations of past human rights abuses and how they have done so. It 
further explores what is missing from these processes and how a treaty on 
business and human rights could help fill those voids and advance victims’ 
rights to truth, justice, and reparations. 
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Resumo 
Embora a definição e o propósito da justiça de transição (JT) não impeçam 
a inclusão do envolvimento dos atores comerciais não-estatais no estado 
autoritário ou violência de conflitos armados passados, esses tipos de 
violações de direitos humanos (VDH) não estão incluídos nos mandatos 
formais de JT. No entanto, na prática, os processos de JT incluíram medidas 
ad hoc para responsabilizar os atores econômicos por essas violações. Este 
artigo procura participar das discussões em andamento e do projeto de uma 
proposta de um tratado sobre empresas e direitos humanos, iniciada pela 
ONU, adicionando a dimensão da JT. A partir da base de dados de 
Responsabilidade Corporativa e Justiça Transitória (CATJ) busca-se mostrar 
que as iniciativas de JT já incorporaram atores econômicos em 
investigações passadas de abusos de direitos humanos e como eles o 
fizeram. Além disso, explora-se o que falta nesses processos e como um 
tratado sobre direitos humanos e empresas poderia ajudar a preencher 
essas lacunas e promover os direitos das vítimas à verdade, à justiça e às 
reparações. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the resolution of the United Nations Human Rights Council establishing a 
Working Group on Business and Human Rights (WG) to draft a treaty on the topic, practitioners and 
academics have engaged in a lively debate over the usefulness, content, scope, and elements of such 
an instrument1. This article attempts to advance that discussion by exploring elements of the treaty 
that could achieve transitional justice (TJ) goals regarding economic actors’ complicity with systematic 
or widespread HRVs.  
Transitional justice (TJ), as defined by the United Nations, is the “the full range of processes 
and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale 
past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (Secretary 
General 2004:8). TJ mechanisms have been implemented in societies aimed at addressing massive 
HRVs both in cases of peace processes seeking to end internal armed conflicts and in cases of new 
governments replacing repressive regimes. Its main goals are the recognition of the dignity of 
individuals; the redress and acknowledgment of violations; and the aim to prevent them from 
happening again.  Rooted in accountability and redress for victims of past human rights abuses, the 
mechanisms most commonly associated with TJ are criminal prosecutions, non-judicial “truth-
seeking” processes to expose HRVs, and reparations to victims of HRVs.  
One particular form of past abuse has not formally received attention in TJ mandates: that 
carried out by non-state business actors during periods of state repression and armed conflict.  This 
is not because of a lack of information; the operation of companies in countries with armed conflict 
or authoritarian regime is well-known. It is also not explained by the definition and purpose of TJ; 
neither the wording nor the goals of TJ preclude the inclusion of businesses in accountability efforts. 
Moreover, TJ processes have included what has been termed “corporate complicity” in the human 
rights violations of repressive states and in armed conflict. Indeed, the very origin of TJ in the post-
Holocaust Nuremberg Trials included recognition of the role businesses had played in HRVs, leading 
to the “industrialist trials” carried out by Allied Forces. Nonetheless, scholars and practitioners have 
failed to recognize the efforts to include past involvement of economic actors in human rights 
violations as an integral part of TJ (Payne and Pereira 2015).  
The lack of visibility of the TJ projects may result from the fragmented nature of the study of 
business and human rights. Over the past several years, two sets of scholarship have emerged and 
evolved separately (Payne and Pereira 2016). One – business and human rights -- looks at 
contemporary issues; the other – transitional justice -- examines accountability for past perpetrators 
of state violence without considering businesses’ role in those HRVs. Scholars and practitioners 
working in these two areas have not traditionally engaged in dialogue and, as a result, have failed to 
establish the substantive links between these sets of problems. As a result, these literatures fail to 
recognize enduring patterns: the thread that links past and current abuses by businesses; the role 
                                                                
1 The process aimed to elaborate a business and human rights treaty was established by the United Nations Human Rights 
Council Resolution 26/9 of June 2014. The resolution established an open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group with a 
mandate to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities 
of transnational corporations and other business enterprises (United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution 26/9, 25 June 
2014, A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1) 
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that business has played in financing, sustaining, and collaborating in state violations and armed 
conflict over time; and the impunity that has protected businesses from accountability for HRVs.  
The literature on business and human rights in the current global context aims to investigate 
the patterns of current abuses or how to prevent them. Also, it looks at which sectors of industry, 
countries, or regions are most likely to perpetrate these violations; and what corporate, state or 
global policies or practices are most likely to prevent or reduce them. These studies are mainly 
focused on current dynamics of corporate wrongdoings but do not look at the origins and patterns 
of corporate violence during non-democratic times. Meanwhile, the transitional justice literature that 
has sprung up to deal with accountability for past human rights abuses in dictatorships and armed 
conflict has focused almost exclusively on violence carried out by state forces and their paramilitary 
allies or rebel groups. Accountability for corporate complicity in authoritarian and civil conflict 
situations has been referred to as the “missing piece of the puzzle, to pursue the full spectrum of 
justice and remedy for authoritarian and civil conflict periods.” (Bohoslavsky and Opgenhaffen 
2010:160). The lack of scholarly dialogue is replicated among human rights and transitional justice 
practitioners. In the deliberations over the content, scope, nature and form of a future international 
instrument of international human rights law regulating the activities of transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises (TNCs and OE),2 scant attention has been paid to past patterns of 
corporate complicity in gross violations of human rights during dictatorships and armed conflict.   
Attempts to bridge the gap between transitional justice studies and business and human 
rights are fairly recent, and they have focused particularly on ways to include corporate complicity in 
transitional justice contexts. Although TJ practitioners and academics have mainly focused on state 
actors and their associates (such as paramilitaries) or rebel forces, an emergent wave of studies has 
targeted business complicity. As we discuss in several sections of this paper, our research has revealed 
efforts by human rights practitioners to implement groundbreaking strategies to advance 
accountability mechanisms for business human rights violations in all regions of the world. In addition, 
scholars such as Carranza (Carranza 2008), Gray (Gray 2007) Michalowski (Michalowski 2013), 
Verbitsky and Bohovslasky (Verbitsky and Bohoslavsky 2013, 2015), and Payne and Pereira (Payne and 
Pereira 2015, 2016, 2018) have begun documenting accountability efforts for business human rights 
complicity in academic publications. This paper attempts to further connect the heretofore disparate 
business and human rights and transitional justice fields through the exploration of an international 
binding instrument.  
It does so by introducing the Corporate Accountability and Transitional Justice (CATJ) 
database3 (Part II).  The article is grounded in empirical evidence derived from this database that 
reveal certain aspects of corporate complicity with HRVs in the context of authoritarian regimes and 
                                                                
2 Business complicity in TJ received some attention only in the second session of the WG in October 2016. Alfred de Zayas, UN 
Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, addressed the need of the new 
treaty to regulate business behavior in the context of conflict and authoritarian regimes.  See also contributions by ANDHES, 
CELS and Dejusticia to the discussion: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session2/Pages/WrittenContributions.aspx>; 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session2/PanelVI/CentrodeEstudios_Legales_y_Sociales.pdf>; 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session2/Pages/PanelIV.aspx>. 
3 The CATJ database includes cases where businesses have been named in non-judicial and judicial transitional justice 
mechanisms (truth commissions, justice and peace process in Colombia and judicial actions) as being complicit with abuses 
committed in the course of an armed conflict or an authoritarian regime.  
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civil conflicts4. The data collected by both practitioners and academics in the CATJ suggests that 
business complicity has been a key component of the violence used during authoritarian regimes and 
civil conflicts.  
The findings from the database suggest that current developments in corporate complicity in 
TJ contexts can inform the discussion on the scope and content of the international binding 
instrument. In section III of the article we look at the main principles of transitional justice to achieve 
its goals. We focus on states’ obligations arising from their duty to protect against, respect, and 
remedy the HRVs by state and non-state business entities. Our proposals are elaborated in the form 
of general elements rather than specific provisions to be included in the treaty5. Specifically, we 
promote: judicial accountability and access to justice; non – judicial forms of accountability; inclusion 
of domestic companies along with TNCs; collective reparations; extraterritorial accountability; and 
the establishment of a monitoring and supervisory body.  
2. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: THE 
DATABASE 
 The Corporate Accountability and Transitional Justice database is the result of a joint project 
between academics and practitioners6. The University of Oxford, the University of Minnesota, 
ANDHES and CELS in Argentina and Dejusticia in Colombia have collaborated to identify and code 
cases of corporate complicity in HRVs during dictatorships and armed conflicts throughout the world. 
The project aims to track judicial and non-judicial responses to corporate complicity, and includes the 
so-called “industrialist” and slave labor cases in Nazi Germany up to the current conflict in Colombia. 
In addition to mapping where accountability has occurred, the project further considers the type of 
accountability, and the outcome of those accountability processes for victims. In addition to 
generating statistical analysis to consider when, where, why, and how accountability for past 
corporate abuses is possible, the project aims to identify a set of models that could be adapted to 
gaining victims of such abuses remedy in other contexts.  
The database has four subsets of data: (i) a global dataset that includes all judicial actions 
cases involving corporate complicity in HRVs in past authoritarian regimes and armed conflicts; (ii) a 
global dataset of final truth commission reports that include reference to corporate complicity in past 
human rights violations; (iii) a country dataset for Argentina that includes Allegations of business 
                                                                
4 Most of the evidence presented in this document are preliminary results of three action research projects implemented by 
the University of Oxford with the human rights organizations Andhes, Cels and Dejusticia. This paper builds on Andhes’s written 
submission to WG’s second session, mentioned in footnote 6. 
5 Our focus on state obligations regarding business accountability in transitional justice does not mean that we propose that 
the treaty should exclusively regulate state obligations in contexts of gross human rights violations. We are aware that there 
is an intense debate as to whether a binding instrument should establish obligations only for States or duties that would be 
directly incumbent on companies themselves (ICJ 2016: 7). Similarly, there is an important debate on the type of rights the 
global treaty should cover. Particular, some actors such as Ruggie (Ruggie 2013)) proposes that it should address only gross 
human rights violations. We do not address these debates here as they are beyond the scope of this piece. However, we should 
clarify that we do not necessarily agree with these restrictive views. 
6 The authors acknowledge the funders of the Project for their invaluable support: Open Society Foundation and the ESRC 
Knowledge Exchange Impact Acceleration Account. In addition, a number of individuals provided assistance in finding and 
coding cases for the CATJ. This list includes: Andhes Research Assistant Cynthia Cisneros; Oxford University researchers 
Kathryn Babineau and Julia Zulver; University of Minnesota Mondale School of Law students Mary Beale and Ami Hutchinson; 
and Dejusticia researcher Lina Arroyave, and Dejusticia interns: Paula Szy, Sarah Dorman and Lyndsi Allsop.    
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complicity found on judicial actions against state actors in four provinces of Argentina; and (iv) a 
country dataset for Colombia, including allegations of business complicity derived from paramilitary 
leaders’ testimony in the Justicia y Paz prosecutorial process.7 
The CATJ includes a total of 874 observations of companies identified for their involvement 
in HRVs in 37 countries that transitioned from authoritarian rule or armed conflict between 1945 and 
2017. Certain countries, owing to the particular mechanisms used, register a high concentration of 
observations: Colombia (460), Brazil (123), Guatemala (47), Liberia (37), South Africa (36), and Chile 
(23). Three types of TJ mechanisms were coded: (i) truth commissions (335 cases); (ii) judicial actions 
(112 cases); and (iii) the justicia y paz process in Colombia (460 cases).   
The CATJ limits the definition of complicity to the four types emerging from existing case law 
(Maassarani 2005):   
 Joint criminal enterprise (Direct company involvement in the abuse), e.g. use of 
violence by security personnel inside the company’s factories; forced displacement 
 Slave work and other labor-related HRVs 
 Funding or indirectly participating in the abuses (with knowledge of results) e.g. 
Bruno Tesch and Zyklon B in Nuremberg; Swiss Banks in South Africa during Apartheid 
 Creating an illegal enterprise, e.g. “blood diamonds” in Sierra Leone 
The CATJ reveals business participation in all four types of complicity, with more than half 
(54%) of the recorded cases identified as indirect involvement in the violations, and 39% as a joint 
criminal enterprise (direct involvement) between business and state actors (or paramilitary forces).  
Graph 2. Type of complicity 
Source:  Corporate Accountability and Transitional Justice database, 2017 
 
Although a high proportion of cases involve gross HRVs (mainly physical integrity rights, or 
crimes against humanity), the database also reveals environmental degradation as part of the 
atrocities suffered by people in the course of a conflict or authoritarian regime. This dimension of 
atrocities affects the social, economic and cultural rights of peoples. Further exploration will be 
                                                                
7 The research team is in the process of including a fifth subset of cases: a multi-country dataset of judicial actions involving 
corporate complicity in Holocaust HRVs. Although the cases have been coded, the team is in the process of cleaning and 
analyzing the data and thus did not include the results in this article. 
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required in the future to consider the implications of business behavior in the fulfillment of these 
human rights. The distribution of violations is summarized in Graph 2 below. 
 
Graph 2. Distribution of cases of corporate complicity by type of abuse 
Source: Corporate Accountability and Transitional Justice Database, 2017. 
 
In its initial phases, the CATJ has focused in-depth on cases of corporate complicity in 
Colombia and Argentina8. In Colombia, business complicity has occurred in the midst of the internal 
armed conflict and has involved abuses committed by two parties in the conflict: the official armed 
forces (e.g. Occidental Petroleum and the Santo Domingo massacre9) and paramilitary groups (e.g. 
Chiquita Brands and Dole)10. The Justicia y Paz rulings showed a particular concentration of cases in 
the northern part of the country (the Departments of Chocó, Antioquia, Córdoba, Norte de Santander 
and Cesar), and in one particular sector of the economy (cattle ranchers), allegedly involved in 25% of 
the cases. A total of 439 businesses were mentioned by paramilitaries as being allegedly involved in 
forced displacement, homicide, the creation and provision of logistic assistance to paramilitary 
groups. Surprisingly, from the 186 cases with prosecutorial activity, 31 judicial actions concentrate in 
Colombia. However, these actions have rarely resulted in convictions and accountability.   
In Argentina, business complicity in HRVs occurred during the last dictatorship (1976-1983) as 
documented from the very beginning of the democratic transition by the CONADEP (National 
Commission on the Disappearance of Persons) in its Nunca Mas report. The report identified eleven 
companies involved in killing, kidnapping, disappearance, arbitrary detention, and torture. Moreover, 
research conducted by academics and practitioners suggests that the CONADEP underrepresented 
the level of corporate complicity, by identifying at least 47 companies that appear to have been 
involved in gross violations of human rights during that period11. A report generated by the National 
                                                                
8 Argentina and Colombia are the two countries in the database with the highest number of judicial actions against businesses 
(18 and 26 respectively).  
9 See <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-997669>.  
10 The links between businesses and the left wing FARC guerrilla group are still to be determined as part of the TJ mechanisms 
that are under design in Congress during the writing of this article.  
11 The report “Responsabilidad Empresarial en Delitos de Lesa Humanidad: Represión a Trabajadores Durante el Terrorismo de 
Estado" conducted by the National Ministry of Justice, the Center for Legal Studies and FLACSO, accounts for business 
complicity of 22 companies. In the meantime, our own database contains business complicity allegations of 29 companies which 
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Ministry of Justice, the human rights organization CELS, and FLACSO University, claims that killing, 
torture, and disappearance of workers was a systematic practice in which businesses and the state 
were engaged during the dictatorship12.  Despite this knowledge, the memory, truth and justice 
process in the country has mainly focused on the prosecution of state and not non-state economic 
actors. 
The CATJ reveals the particular forms that corporate complicity took form in particular 
regions of Argentina. The CELS Report shows important national patterns of business complicity. For 
example, it reveals that companies involved in HRVs operated in a wide range of sectors of the 
economy. Also, it reveals corporate violence occurred in both rural and urban areas. Meanwhile, our 
in-depth research on the Northwestern region suggests business complicity was mainly concentrated 
on both a reduced number of industries and in rural areas. For example, in Tucumán, 14 of the 22 
companies in the database are sugar mills. In Jujuy, three of four companies identified as complicit in 
HRVs are from the sugar production sector. In these provinces, violence targeted workers in rural 
areas in which large extensions of land and the small villages on it were fully controlled by the 
dictatorship’s repressive apparatus.  
This overview of the CATJ provides the background to the empirical study. In the next section 
of the paper, we examine particular elements of a binding treaty that could advance the TJ efforts 
already underway in piecemeal fashion. Underlying our analysis is the argument that a binding 
agreement would force businesses to recognize their obligations under international human rights 
law. It would further engage TJ practitioners and scholars in the systematic investigation and 
documentation of abuses in which businesses engaged during periods of weak rule of law 
(authoritarian regimes and armed conflict). A binding treaty would thereby advance efforts at 
accountability to promote non-recurrence of violence and to address the rights of victims to truth, 
justice, and reparations. We incorporate findings from the CATJ below in making these arguments. 
3. ELEMENTS FOR A BINDING TREATY 
In this section, we discuss a series of elements that the binding instrument should incorporate 
to achieve accountability for business complicity in TJ contexts. The elements presented in this work 
aim to reaffirm the general duty of the state to respect human rights. In particular, they refer to the 
State’s obligation to investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators of massive HRVs and to punish 
those found guilty; to the right to know the truth about past abuses and the fate of disappeared 
persons; and, the right to reparations for victims of systematic HRVs. 
This general duty means that states should take all necessary and adequate measures to 
ensure accountability for business complicity with massive. We are not using here the term complicity 
in a strictly legal sense, which refers, in general terms, to the position of the criminal accomplice. We 
use the term complicity in a broader sense to refer to the different ways in which companies and/or 
                                                                
are included in the paper “Un modelo de investigación para avanzar en la rendición de cuentas por complicidad corporativa en 
violaciones de derechos humanos en regímenes autoritarios. Estudio de caso sobre Argentina” (ANDHES, Oxford, CELS). Four 
companies are duplicated in both studies (Ledesma, Minera Aguilar, Ingenio Fronterita e Ingenio Concepción).   
12 Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos de la Nación (MJDDHH), Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (Cels) y Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Flacso - Argentina). Responsabilidad empresarial en delitos de lesa humanidad. Represión 
a trabajadores durante el terrorismo de Estado. Tomo I y II. Ed Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos de la Nación. 
Noviembre 2015. 
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their top officials are implicated, directly or indirectly, in the perpetration of massive HRVs13. That 
approach has been used in previous developments of business and human rights regulations. The 
UNGPs, and earlier initiatives such as the UN Global Compact14, recognize that it is not enough for 
businesses to avoid causing adverse human rights impacts, but they also need to avoid contributing 
to HRVs (UN Global Compact 2000; United Nations 2011). According to Principle 2 of the UN Global 
Compact “[c]omplicity basically means being implicated in a human rights abuse that another 
company, government, individual, group, etc is causing.”  
We contend that without binding instruments, and the reliance instead on soft-law or 
voluntary principles, states have failed to address systematic patterns of abuses by business. A treaty 
would recognize the duty of states to address the rights of victims of atrocity – whether carried out 
by non-state business or state actors – to truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence. 
The key elements to be emphasized in a binding agreement that emerge from our empirical study 
that advance TJ goals include: examined in this article are: 1) judicial accountability and access to 
justice; (2) non-judicial forms of accountability; (3) non-discrimination in terms of company ownership; 
(4) collective reparations; (5) extra-territorial enforcement duty; and (6) monitoring. These six 
elements also link the two existing approaches to corporate complicity in human rights violations in 
TJ and non-TJ contexts. 
3.1  JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE  
According to International Human Rights law, any victim of human rights violations has the 
right to an effective remedy, to know the truth and obtain fair compensation. The fulfillment of this 
right depends, in general terms, on the existence of a legal framework establishing legal 
accountability of human rights perpetrators and the availability and effectiveness of legal remedies 
to provide redress to victims of HRVs and their relatives.  
In the TJ field, trials for serious violations of human rights have been a fundamental tool in 
the reconstruction of democracy after authoritarian rule and armed conflict. Particularly, the 
investigation and prosecution of HRVs arise from international legal obligations that can be traced 
back to the Nuremberg trials (Anon n.d.; Bernaz 2017; Teitel 2003). However, judicial corporate 
accountability has been marginal in TJ contexts.  
The evidence included in our database of judicial actions against both companies and 
individuals acting on behalf of companies suggests a low level of both judicial activity and judicial 
accountability. Of the 874 cases recorded in the CATJ, we found prosecutorial activity in only 136 
cases (13%).  Only 23% (37) had significant accountability results in terms of convictions of either 
companies or individuals working for a company. Settlements, arguably another form of 
accountability, have occurred in 17% (27) of the cases.  Although there are only 4% (7) of cases with 
acquittals, the lack of business accountability is observed in the small number of cases mentioned 
above in which any prosecutorial activity occurred, as well as the outcomes of those that were taken 
                                                                
13 For a discussion on the advantages of using the term in a non-legal sense, see for example ICJ 2008 Vol 1: 3 
<https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.1-Corporate-legal-accountability-thematic-report-2008.pdf>. 
14 “The Global Compact (GC) is a voluntary initiative [launched in 2000] intended primarily for corporations to pledge 
commitment to human/labour rights and environmentalism (and anti-corruption after 2004)” (Lim and Tsutsui 2012). It is part 
of the global effort to affect corporate behaviour. 
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to court: 28% (48) of judicial actions were dismissed, and in 21% (35) of the cases a final decision is 
still pending.  
Notably, scarce judicial investigations against companies and individuals working for 
companies exist in contexts of intense judicial activity against state and paramilitary actors. For 
example, in Chile as of December 1, 2015, there are 1,373 state officers on trial, indicted and 
convicted. In sharp contrast, only one Chilean businessman has faced conviction despite 16 companies 
listed in the two truth commission processes as being involved in violations. Similarly, Argentina, 
another judicial accountability country leader, only 19 judicial actions have been put forward and only 
two companies and one top officer of another company have been convicted for their involvement in 
atrocities15.  
This lack of legal accountability also occurs in countries where prosecutorial activity has 
provided evidence suggesting the involvement of companies in massive violations of human rights.  
This context of impunity for the corporations is compounded by shortcomings of the legal 
systems of several states (Oxford Pro Bono Público 2008). As the International Commission of Jurists 
(International Commission of Jurists 2015:19) argues in relation to corporate accountability, many 
states do not establish provisions in their legal frameworks establishing legal liability of legal persons 
and clear provisions of liability for top company officers, including main shareholders, CEOs, 
managers of companies and other executives like chiefs of security.   
Regarding criminal responsibility of companies, in most countries, this does not exist and 
where it does it only covers a heterogeneous set of serious human rights abuses and not others 
(International Commission of Jurists 2015:20). Also, the rules or hurdles set in jurisprudence to 
attribute criminal responsibility to a corporation differ across jurisdictions (International Commission 
of Jurists 2015:20). Although criminal responsibility of individuals such as company CEOs and top 
officers fall within the scope of criminal law, how to legally attribute criminal responsibility to those 
individuals on account of corporate crimes remains unclear and subject to insufficient state practice 
(International Commission of Jurists 2015:20). TJ contexts pose further challenges to criminal 
responsibility of both corporations and company officers. The connection of the individual crimes 
with a broader and systematic situation of HRVs has to be demonstrated. Such factual linkages should 
be elaborated under a legally sound doctrine of criminal responsibility.  
Another feature that a legal accountability framework should incorporate is civil liability of 
companies for their involvement in human rights violations in TJ contexts. Although laws providing 
for civil remedies are common to most legal systems in the world, some substantive, procedural and 
practical obstacles often undermine the potential of civil remedies as an effective accountability 
mechanism (International Commission of Jurists 2015:22). As discussed above, some civil actions have 
attempted to make businesses accountable, but their overall outcome is not positive. That outcome 
is in part due to the inadequacy of private law regimes to address HRVs but also due to the imbalance 
                                                                
15 Research conducted by academics and practitioners suggests that at least 47 companies might have been involved in gross 
violations of human rights. The report “Responsabilidad Empresarial en Delitos de Lesa Humanidad: Represión a Trabajadores 
Durante el Terrorismo de Estado" conducted by the National Ministry of Justice, the Center for Legal Studies and FLACSO, 
accounts for business complicity of 22 companies. In the meantime, our own database contains business complicity allegations 
of 29 companies which are included in the paper “Un modelo de investigación para avanzar en la rendición de cuentas por 
complicidad corporativa en violaciones de derechos humanos en regímenes autoritarios. Estudio de caso sobre Argentina” 
(ANDHES, Oxford, CELS). Four companies are duplicated in both studies (Ledesma, Minera Aguilar, Ingenio Fronterita e Ingenio 
Concepción).   
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of rights and privileges granted to corporations, particularly TNCs, and the relatively weak regime of 
private law to be used in holding them accountable, as the ICJ has pointed out.  
There is one particular aspect of private law that represents an obstacle for accountability in 
TJ contexts. Usually, civil legal remedies are subject to statutes of limitations, which in practice 
operate as temporal barriers to access to justice. Both the nature of systematic HRVs and the 
complexity to investigate them call for the removal of such a barrier. The inapplicability of statutes 
of limitations in international law has been established by some instruments and human rights bodies 
such as the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity. Traditionally, this mandate has been incorporated into domestic criminal legal 
systems but not private law systems. One of the few states that has incorporated this international 
prescription to its private law regime is Argentina. In 2015 a new civil code came into force and 
established, among other substantial modifications, that any civil actions connected to crimes against 
humanity against natural and legal persons are not subject to the statute of limitations. 
The prohibition of the statute of limitations should also be expanded to other public law 
regimes. As discussed by the ICJ (International Commission of Jurists 2015) specific laws on consumer 
protection, environmental harm and labor relations also generally establish grounds of legal liability 
for corporations, which may also be used to pursue business accountability. In fact, labor laws have 
been used as an accountability mechanism in Argentina in TJ contexts (Payne and Pereira 2016). In 
February 2012 in the “Ingegnieros” case, an Appeals Labor Court dismissed the statute of limitations 
claims of a legal action brought to the court. Maria Gimena Ingegnieros, the daughter of Enrique 
Roberto Ingegnieros, brought the case. She requested financial compensation for her father’s 
disappearance during the civil-military dictatorship. She claimed that Techint SA should pay 
compensation given its role as co-author of the crime of disappearance on the company’s grounds. 
The company has denied the claim and further contends that the worker safety law, under which the 
case was brought, has a two-year statute of limitations that had long ago run out. The Appeals Court 
rejected that claim, declaring that statutes of limitation do not apply to compensation claims linked 
to crimes against humanity.16 The April 2007 SIDERCA case, brought by Ana María Cebrymsky, the 
wife of Oscar Orlando Bordisso, heard by the Supreme Court of the Province of Buenos Aires follows 
a similar logic. Bordisso disappeared shortly after he left work in 1977. In 1995, his wife claimed 
compensation from his employer – SIDERCA – under Argentine labor law, arguing specifically that the 
country’s work safety law obliged the company to protect her husband from entering and exiting the 
work site. The company rejected the claim and argued for the dismissal of the legal action due to the 
statute of limitations. The first instance tribunal accepted the claim against the company. On appeal, 
the company lost again in the Provincial Supreme Court. The Court ordered compensation for 
Bordisso’s widow. 
It should be noted that the implementation of effective legal remedies does not depend only 
on adequate legal accountability frameworks in TJ contexts. According to academic studies and 
human rights organizations reports, structural conditions also facilitate impunity regarding business 
involvement in human rights violations (Payne and Pereira 2016). In many countries, corporate elites 
are part of the ruling and judicial elite structure, recreating a context of impunity (Payne and Pereira 
                                                                
16 See latest developments here <http://www.diariojudicial.com.ar/fuerolaboral/Se-le-vino-la-noche-a-empresas-donde-hubo-
desaparecidos-20120215-0002.html>. 
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2018). Also, the economic sustainability and development of some states depend on corporate actors 
linked to massive human rights violations (Abrahams 2013). Corporations use their economic power 
to influence directly or indirectly the justice system to secure impunity (Paul and Schönsteiner 
2013:85; Sánchez 2013:115). Businesses, particularly TNCs or large domestic firms, have resources to 
hire expensive law firms and legal teams that can draw out cases and engage in jurisdictional forum 
shopping and other lengthy judicial processes; these resources are usually unavailable to the victims 
of abuse or their legal representatives. Finally, some TNCs and OE have used illegal means to ensure 
impunity by intimidating, threatening or paying victims and their families and bribing members of the 
judiciary (Payne and Pereira 2016).   
The binding instrument should incorporate the obligation of states to create an effective 
legal framework of business accountability in TJ contexts. The framework should incorporate the 
obligation of States to establish criminal liability of both natural and legal persons, as well as clear 
standards to attribute such criminal responsibility to both types of persons. Also, the state should be 
mandated to adapt their private law regimes to serve as a useful mechanism for accountability. 
Particularly, states should remove statues of limitations of both civil and criminal actions connected 
to crimes against humanity. Finally, state obligations should include the establishment of any positive 
measure to remove structural barriers to access to justice and remedies that victims and their 
relatives might face. 
3.2  NON –  JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABIL ITY  
Citizens in societies affected by massive and systematic HRVs have the right to know what 
happened to victims during violent times. Although it has not been an object of a specific 
international convention, it is included in a wide range of international and regional human rights 
instruments, and it has been developed by monitoring bodies of some human rights treaties 
(Paterson 2016). The right to truth has an individual and a collective dimension. It entitles both victims 
and their relatives to know the facts and circumstances of the specific crimes that affected them and 
society in general to know the truth about violence and HRVs 17. Although it has not been the object 
of a specific international convention, this right is considered either derived from other well-
established rights in international human rights law, such as the right to a remedy; or, to be an 
autonomous right, independent of or in addition to these other rights. Nevertheless, the core 
elements of the right are well accepted.  
Truth Commissions (TCs) are one of the most frequently non-judicial tools used to address 
the right to know about massive human rights violations. TCs are generally aimed to clarify and 
officially acknowledge the truth about massive HRVs (Hayner 2001). In that regard, they seek to 
determine “the facts, root causes, and societal consequences of past human rights violations” (The 
International Center for Transitional Justice n.d.). Their finding and recommendations might be used 
for criminal justice, reparations, and institutional reform processes to redress past abuses and 
prevent new ones from occurring.  
                                                                
17 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights defines this as “a collective right that ensures society’s access to 
information that is essential for the workings of democratic systems, and it is also a private right for relatives of the victims, 
which affords a form of compensation, in particular, in cases where amnesty laws are adopted.”() Cited in Engstrom 2016: 11. 
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It is generally argued that TCs have not addressed the involvement of corporate actors in 
human rights violations. However, in our research, we reviewed all of the available final reports 
produced by truth commissions around the world and found that just over half of them (56%; or 22 
out of 39 final reports) identify the role of economic actors in human rights violations. The distribution 
of these mechanisms is not uniform across the world. There is a high concentration in Latin America 
with 12 TCs in 10 countries.  
The evidence collected in our research suggests three crucial barriers to the implementation 
of strong TCs that can account for business complicity. First, no national truth commission has 
included the role of business in human rights violations of former authoritarian regimes or armed 
conflict as part of the official mandate. When truth commissions have investigated corporate 
complicity, this has occurred in a more ad hoc manner. A treaty would no doubt encourage future 
truth commissions to include human rights violations by business as a significant area for addressing 
the rights of victims to truth, justice, and remedy. 
Although truth commissions have not included corporate complicity in their formal mandates, 
over half (56%) have not only carried out investigations but have also named names of companies and 
economic actors involved in violations. The CATJ contains a list of 321 names of companies named in 
the final truth commission reports of 19 countries around the world. By identifying by name those 
economic actors engaged in human rights violations, truth commissions have held them at least 
symbolically responsible for their role (in order of frequency) in financing repression, arbitrary 
detention, kidnapping, torture, extrajudicial killing, forced disappearance, and other international 
human rights violations. A treaty would codify into law the practice of holding economic actors 
responsible for gross violations of human rights. The truth commission investigations would initiate 
a process that courts would be expected to pursue according to the binding agreement. 
As it is, the CATJ shows that truth commissions have not tended to include judicial 
investigations as a follow-up to their findings on corporate complicity. This is, thus, the third block. 
Only 12 truth commission reports in 30 countries (or 40%) establish specific recommendations 
regarding corporate complicity. All of them address in vague language the need for businesses to 
comply with human rights standards. Two (East Timor and South Africa) call on economic actors to 
make voluntary payments to a reparations program. Only two others (Brazil and Liberia) mention 
investigation to determine judicial action against businesses. In the absence of binding agreements 
in international law regarding business and human rights, truth commissions thus experience some 
constraint in terms of recommending costly action that might curb businesses from engaging in 
future violations or fulfill victims’ rights to truth, justice, and remedy. A binding instrument would 
likely increase truth commissions’ investigations into corporate complicity in past HRVs and to include 
in their final recommendations further judicial investigations. 
The most recent truth commission – the 2012 National Truth Commission in Brazil – suggests 
that increased global attention to business HRVs may prompt movement in the direction of holding 
businesses accountable. The initiative came not from the National Commission itself, however, but 
the Sao Paulo Commission. The Sao Paulo Commission included corporate complicity in its original 
mandate and then actively pressured for its investigation to be included in the final national report. 
The Sao Paulo Commission identified nearly all of the 123 economic actors named in the final national 
report. That commission, in turn, identified over one-third of the full list of economic actors named in 
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all truth commissions. The National Truth Commission in Brazil, moreover, included in its 
recommendations the judicial investigations into cases of corporate complicity. One set of 
investigations – of the Volkswagen subsidiary in Sao Paulo, is underway due to pressure and 
information from victims who had testified in the Sao Paulo Truth Commission. The success in the 
Brazil case has depended on local level organization and mobilization of workers in Sao Paulo. The 
same sort of civil society initiative has overcome obstacles -- the absence of a mandate, lack of clear 
international law to apply, and specific recommendations to hold economic actors accountable under 
that law – that we have seen block other truth commission initiatives.   
Our findings suggest the need to establish specific state obligations to implement effective 
mechanisms to account for the participation of TNCs and OE in massive human rights violations in 
order to guarantee the right to truth of the victims and society in general. Half of the countries that 
implemented TCs in transitional contexts have ignored this issue. Furthermore, most TCs do not 
establish specific mandates to account for the involvement of corporate actors in massive human 
rights violations. Also, not all TCs that provided names of TNCs and OE syndicated as perpetrators of 
human rights violations. Finally, the evidence suggests that it is necessary to establish guidelines to 
determine the types of recommendations that TCs should include to ensure the right to truth, access 
to justice and reparation for victims and their families of massive violations of HR. 
3.3  TREATY SCOPE:  TRANSNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COMPANIES ’  REGULATION  
One of the main discussions about the treaty refers to the kind of business enterprises it 
should regulate. The controversy revolves around whether the term 'other companies' refers 
exclusively to companies whose activities are transnational (TNCs) or if it includes local companies 
regulated by national law18. This question, called the  depth  question (Deva 2017) was triggered by a 
‘footnote’  in  the  resolution of the Human Rights Council establishing the WG which states that other 
business enterprises denotes all business enterprises that have a transnational character in their 
operational activities, and does not apply to local businesses registered in terms of relevant domestic 
law. 
Much of the literature on the topic of corporations and human rights focuses on the concept 
of the ‘transnational corporation.' This is explained by the concern in the UN during the 1980s with 
foreign corporations operating in the developing world (Clapham 2006:199). The ‘transnationality’ of 
corporations has led to the possibility of companies having their headquarters in one country, being 
incorporated in a second country, operating in a third and fourth country, with workers from a fifth 
country and shareholders from a sixth state (Clapham 2006:200). This management arrangement 
increases the difficulty of regulating their operations, which is why the Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (United 
Nations Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 2003) and the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (United Nations 2011) focus on creating a framework that 
is particularly concerned with transnational, as oppose to national, companies (Ruggie 2013).  
                                                                
18 For a discussion on the implications of this discussion see <http://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Global-Report-
ScopeBusinessTreaty-2015.pdf>. 
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However, despite the fact that corporate abuses by TNCs are more broadly publicized and 
targeted by civil society organizations, this does not mean that national companies are not involved 
in human rights abuses. They have, however, been largely overlooked by the media and civil society 
because of their low visibility at a global level. This provides a perfect scenario for domestic 
companies to commit abuses without monitoring beyond the state where they are incorporated. It 
further fails to recognize the universal right of victims for protection against human rights abuses, 
regardless of the national origin of the violator. 
The current trend seems to move towards the adoption of instruments where all companies, 
not only TNCs, must be included. As an example, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(1976) and the Tripartite declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social 
policy (1977) included only TNCs, but the review of both instruments in the year 2000 extended its 
scope to other companies. More importantly, the two standard setting initiatives at the UN level 
preceding the current treaty process have moved in this direction (International Commission of 
Jurists 2015). The Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights defined  “other business enterprises” as “any business 
entity, regardless of the international or domestic nature of its activities, including a transnational 
corporation, contractor, subcontractor, supplier, licensee or distributor; the corporate, partnership, 
or other legal form used to establish the business entity; and the nature of the ownership of the 
entity.” (United Nations Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 2003:20). 
Similarly, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, established in its general principle 
that the principles “apply to all States and to all business enterprises, both transnational and others, 
regardless of their size, sector, location, ownership, and structure.” (United Nations 2011)19  
The CATJ data further reinforce the notion of the international regulation of TNCs20 as well 
as national firms. National corporations have been the protagonist of HRVS in TJ contexts. As Graph 
3 below shows a higher concentration of domestic firms (43% or 375 companies) than transnational 
enterprises (15% or 127), from diverse sectors of the economy,21 have been implicated in HRVs in 
judicial and non-judicial transitional justice mechanisms.  
Graph 3. Nationality of firms 
                                                                
19 Report elaborated by the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Business and Human Rights (which worked 
between 2005 and 2011) and endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011. 
20 They are, after all, some of the most powerful forces in the world economy; and they present a challenge in terms of 
jurisdiction and regulation that they abide by.  
21 The other 42% of cases involve domestic individuals (40%) and unknown nationality of the business (2%). The sectors of the 
economy more represented in the sample are: Agriculture (31% (271)), natural resources (14% (120)), Consumer 
products/retail (10% (85)), Finance (6% (53)).  
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This data suggests that the regulatory efforts need to be encompassing and not only focus 
on the role and operation of TNCs. It is also important to note the arbitrary distinction at times of 
ownership. Some companies in Colombia, for example, were domestic at the beginning of the conflict 
but by the end of the conflict had become Colombian-headquartered TNCs.22 
Also, in the case of Argentina, our preliminary findings suggest that corporate engagement 
in serious HRVs has not been limited to the actions of TNCs. Indeed, we observe a high participation 
of domestic enterprises in the commission of these crimes. In Argentina, there is information linking 
at least 40 firms, with serious HRVs in the period 1975-1983. In the province of Tucuman, for example, 
12 of the 16 companies implicated in HRVs are linked to the sugar industry, the main local economic 
activity. During this period, according to allegations found in judicial files, various national companies 
gave over their facilities for military operations and the establishment of Clandestine Centres of 
Illegal Detentions and Tortures (CCDs). As an example, some testimonies mention the case of La 
Fronterita sugar mill.  In the first case, at least twenty-nine (29) victims were illegally detained and/or 
tortured in the company’s facilities between January 1975 and May 1976. In the second case, at least 
thirty-one (31) people were victims of illegal deprivation of liberty and/or torture in company grounds 
between February 1975 and July 1976 and at least five (5) of them are missing. In both cases, the 
crimes were committed in the context of a constitutional government.23   
Similarly, in Colombia, from the 28% of cases where companies were involved, only 3% of the 
cases reported by the Justicia y Paz rulings involved TNCs. The other 25% were domestic companies 
working in the agriculture and retail sectors of the economy. For example, there is the case of several 
companies working in the Urabá region of Colombia (northern part of the country) that worked hand 
in hand with the paramilitary forces to displace Afro-Colombian communities from their collective 
ancestral lands in order to build large oil palm plantations. Forced displacement was used not only as 
a war strategy but also as a business strategy. The economic project started in 1999 and by 2005 the 
companies owned half of the lands (Defensoría del Pueblo 2005; Juzgado Quinto Penal del Circuito 
Especializado de Medellin 2014). 
The evidence suggests that national companies might have been involved in systematic HRVs 
during both authoritarian governments and conflicts. The provisions of the new binding instruments 
should be applied to such national companies if it intends to promote accountability and close the 
impunity gap that benefited those companies. As the ICJ (International Commission of Jurists 2015) 
sustains, that coverage is the most consistent with the approach followed to date by the United 
                                                                
22 Comments made by Mónica Cortes Yepes of the UNDP at the Universidad del Rosario conference on “Pasos hacia el 
posconflicto: un análisis desde miradas comparadas,” Bogotá, Colombia, 17 November 2016.  
23 El 5/2/1975 el gobierno constitucional de María Estela Martinez de Perón, dio inicio a través del Decreto Nº262/75 al llamado 
“Operativo Independencia” el cual consistió en la primera intervención masiva de las fuerzas armadas y de seguridad en un plan 
sistemático de exterminio de opositores políticos mediante la utilización del aparato estatal y de control social a través del 
terror, llevada adelante con la aquiescencia del gobierno civil en la provincia de Tucumán desde febrero de 1975. Si bien la 
intervención se produjo durante un gobierno democrático, marcó el compás del creciente proceso de autonomización de las 
fuerzas armadas respecto de los poderes constitucionales, constituyéndose en el acto preparatorio central del golpe de estado 
del 24 de marzo de 1976 (REJ Causa: “Operativo Independencia” Expte. Nº 1.015/04 y sus causas conexas y acumuladas 
jurídicamente) los delitos de lesa humanidad cometidos durante este período están siendo juzgando actualmente en juicio oral 
y público ante el tribunal oral federal en lo criminal de la provincia de Tucumán. 
Can a treaty on business and human rights help achieve transitional justice goals? 16 
 
Homa Publica - Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos e Empresas | 2526-0774 | Vol. 01 Nº 02 | Jan-Jun 2017 | e:017 
Nations and also with the original aims of ensuring legally binding human rights duties for business 
enterprises. 
3.4  COLLECTIVE REPARATIONS  
States have an obligation under international law to provide reparations to victims of massive 
HRVs (Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky 2011; van Zyl 2011)24. Demands for reparations are prevalent in 
post-conflict negotiations and, thus, become a crucial TJ mechanism (Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky 
2011).   
Reparations in TJ contexts attempt to restore victims to the positions they would have been 
in had the HRVs not occurred (Roht-Arriaza 2004; Roht-Arriza and Orlovsky 2009). Material 
reparations include restitutions of: material goods such as land, jobs, pensions restitutions; health 
rehabilitation, such as medical, psychiatric, and occupational therapy; and monetary compensations 
such as lump-sums, package of services for victims and relatives, and pensions. Moral reparations 
include a wide range of initiatives such as official acknowledgment and apologies; disclosure of the 
circumstances in which HRVs took place and the names of perpetrators; the emplacement of 
memorials, among others.  
Reparations can be established through either judicial procedures or reparation policies. 
Court-ordered reparations generally entail individualized considerations of damages to each claimant 
based on the idea of putting the individual back in the position he/she would have been in the absence 
of the human right violation. Meanwhile, reparation policies to operate either by providing a uniform 
sum to all victims or through a schedule of amounts for different violations and do not attempt to 
define or repair the full amount of the losses (Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky 2011).   
Both reparations ordered by courts and reparations policies can be individual or collective. 
Individual reparations serve as recognition of specific harm to an individual. Meanwhile, collective 
reparations respond, among others, to collective harms and harms to social cohesion, to re-establish 
social solidarity, and to maximize the effectiveness of existing resources. The collective aspect of 
reparations can arise from the fact that they are distributed in a non-individualized way, they include 
public goods tied to specific communities, or they aim to repair the harm suffered by a particular 
group (Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky 2011).  
A treaty contributing to business accountability in TJ contexts should incorporate state 
obligations to guarantee reparations to victims. We would like to focus on one particular aspect of 
such obligation: the establishment of collective reparations.  There is a pattern of business complicity 
with HRVs in violent times, which reveals that business violence is usually directed against specific 
groups. The sphere of influence of business operations makes groups like workers, local communities 
and human rights and community leaders more likely to be targeted in times of repression or conflict. 
These groups pose a threat to the operation of companies by e.g. asking for increased labor 
guarantees, opposing the operation of the company in communal lands, or opposing the company’s 
operations because of the negative environmental impact. Some of these groups have even managed 
                                                                
24 The victim’s legal right to reparation is articulated in the basic human rights instruments, specialized conventions, nonbinding 
instruments, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and in the UN’s 2005 Basic Principles on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (Roht-Arriaza 2004; Roht-Arriaza & Katharine Orlovsky 2011) 
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to put company operations in stand still. Moreover, repressive regimes and paramilitary forces target 
them for their perceived left-wing political orientation. In this way, business and state interests to 
silence these groups collide. For example, in Colombia25 and Argentina we see a pattern in businesses 
providing lists of union leaders to paramilitary forces and to state forces. These leaders would later 
on be kidnapped, disappeared, tortured and killed. And these violent actions would serve to purposes: 
to eliminate perceived left wing opposition to current power structures, and to eliminate obstacles 
to smooth operation of businesses.  We also see as noted above, that corporate complicity can be 
concentrated in particular geographic zones and sectors (such as the sugar industry in the north of 
Argentina or the palm oil industry in Colombia).  In Argentina, for example, we found that criminal 
prosecutions provide valuable evidence of potential business complicity. In our study of 14 rulings 
and one request of prosecution in the Northwestern region of Argentina in which only states officers 
were prosecuted, we found evidence suggesting that at least 30 companies might have been involved 
in crimes against humanity. We found that such involvement might account for HRVs against more 
than 400 individuals26. Notwithstanding this evidence, no judicial actions were initiated against 
companies in these provinces. Only one criminal prosecution was launched against two businessmen 
in the province of Jujuy.  
Similarly, in Colombia, our research on Justicia y Paz processes suggest that paramilitaries 
confessed to over 400 cases of corporate complicity, but very few cases reach the courts and those 
that do very seldom reach a favorable outcome for the victims. Only in less than a third of the cases 
(31%) mentioned by the paramilitaries, there was an explicit order from the court to the prosecutors 
to start an official investigation. Moreover, from those cases, only in 6% of the cases, a trial was 
started. However, the few cases that have reached a trial, combined with the recent institutional 
interest in prosecutions, are important precedents for future litigation. There is, for example, the 
Chiquita Brands case under the U.S. Alien Torts Statute27, and some domestic cases like the oil palm 
companies in the Pacific region of the country, where businessmen were convicted in 2014 for their 
involvement in forced displacement (the ruling was confirmed in the appeal in 2016).  
Because of the losses not only to the direct and individual victims and their families, but to 
whole communities, collective reparations could provide a response that gets to the developmental 
set backs of these types of violations. 
Unions have been particularly targeted in contexts of massive HRVs. Returning to the case of 
the northern province of Tucuman in Argentina, unionized workers in the sugar industry became the 
paradigmatic victims of massive HRVs.28. We found that the number of victims of serious human rights 
violations with business involvement currently amounts to three hundred and fifteen (315) between 
1974 and 1977. Around 55% of these cases were workers of the companies. From the total number 
of victims, around 70% had some kind of union activity. At least 60 of those victims were actively 
                                                                
25 One of the emblematic cases in Colombia of collusion of paramilitary and business interests to silence union workers (who 
were identified by paramilitary forces as members or supporters of left wing guerrilla groups) is the case of Sindicato Nacional 
de Trabajadores de la Industria de Alimentos - SINALTRAINAL, the union workers of the food industry. There was an ATS lawsuit 
in the US against Coca-Cola for the role of its bottling companies in Colombia in anti-union violence against SINALTRAINAL 
workers. The lawsuit was dismissed in 2009. See: <https://business-humanrights.org/en/coca-cola-lawsuit-re-colombia>.  
26 Prior to our research, only 42 victims were connected to business complicity involving one company. 
27 See <https://business-humanrights.org/en/chiquita-lawsuits-re-colombia>.  
28 We found that 14 of the 22 companies in the database are sugar mills. 
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engaged in defense of labor rights, while in only seven (7) cases the victims were involved in other 
kinds of organizations or political parties. As other research suggest, the military government aimed 
to weaken the active Sugar Industry Workers Union of Tucumán (FOTIA) given their strong 
organization and resistance to sugar mill companies’ internal policies as well as government policies29.   
Meanwhile, In Colombia, some of the most emblematic cases of business complicity with 
paramilitary groups involve the torture, killing, and disappearance of unionized workers (e.g. Chiquita 
Brands, Drummond30, Coca-Cola). By financing the paramilitaries, businesses had access to a 
“protection scheme” that included repression of all social protest coming from union members, 
activists, community leaders, human rights defenders, or any other individual who was labeled as 
‘guerrillero.' The Grupo de Memoria Histórica (GMH) (Group of Historical Memory) was able to 
document the selective murders of 685 union members. However, the number of unionized workers 
killed in the course of the conflict is debated. While the GMH records only 658 deaths, the Escuela 
Nacional Sindical (ENS) and the UNDP recorded approximately 2,800 deaths from 1984 to 2011 
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013:46). The ESN has a database of violence against union 
members that is not open to the public, which is why there is a lot that we do not know about business 
complicity in violence against union members. Particularly regarding small and medium sized 
domestic companies and state-owned companies. However, in interviews with the leaders of the ESN, 
we were told that entire unions were annihilated in the course of the armed conflict.  
The new treaty should establish the obligation of state to implement an adequate framework 
of national remedies for victims of human rights abuse perpetrated directly or indirectly by business 
enterprises. That framework should establish reparations trough both courts-based mechanisms and 
policy schemes. Given the particularities of business involvement in massive violations of human 
rights, such framework should incorporate collective remedies in the sense that group such as union 
should be entitled to claim reparations either in courts or trough more general policies. 
3.5  EXTRATERRITORIAL RESP ONSIBILITY  
In contexts of TJ, one of the ways to achieve justice and reparations for gross violations of 
human rights was through judicial processes taking place in countries that had not carried out such 
violations. This kind of judicial process, usually based on universal principles of justice, has the 
immediate effect of bringing justice to particular victims and, in turn, contribute to the longer term 
generation of international pressure. Along with other variables, international pressure and 
international political opportunities provide the conditions to achieve justice for massive HRVs. In 
that sense, judicial processes occurring in countries other than those that committed human rights 
abuses are crucial for TJ, though not very often used. There have been several prosecutions of former 
Nazis carried out by domestic courts under universal jurisdiction in countries like France (the Klaus 
Barbie case tried by the Cour de Cassation Française), Israel (the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem), 
Belgium, and Canada. More recent developments include the appeal to universal jurisdiction by UK 
                                                                
29 Nassif, Silvia. Declaración como testigo experto ante el Tribunal Oral en lo Criminal Federal de la Provincia de Tucumán, 22 
de junio de 2016. Tesis: “Las luchas obraras tucumanas durante la autodenominada “Revolución Argentina” en el período 1966-
1973” (ofrecida como prueba documental por la fiscalía).   
30 See PAX, El Lado Oscuro del Carbón, 
<http://www.cronicon.net/paginas/Documentos/El%20Lado%20oscuro%20del%20carbon.pdf>. 
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and Spanish judges (particularly Baltazar Garzón) in order to prosecute crimes against humanity 
committed by former officials of the Chilean and Argentinean military regimes. 
Regarding the liability of TNCs and OE in contexts of transition, we observe that this pathway 
has been explored as a way of bringing justice and reparation to the victims. Of the 136 judicial 
processes identified in the CATJ, 44 occurred or are underway in states other than where the HRVs 
were committed (Payne and Pereira 2016). These trials are not explicitly based on universal 
jurisdiction principles but rather on more traditional principles of jurisdiction that appeal to the 
nationality of the defendant. They show, however, that victims and human rights advocates are using 
foreign litigation strategies to hold businesses accountable, similar to the processes by which these 
actors attempted to establish the accountability of state agents.  Claimants have looked to the courts 
of the countries where TNCs are registered (home states) or where they have substantial economic 
operations to achieve justice for abuses in host countries.   
These processes face the obstacles mentioned above. Also, in some countries, the 
extraterritorial obligations of companies have been limited by court rulings, such as US Supreme 
Court decision in the Kiobel case that has appeared to affect the use of the Alien Torts Statute in the 
United States.  As a result this type of litigation yields few substantive results regarding accountability 
and reparation. We found only one convictions and 10 out of court settlements in our database. 
These processes also pose two problems for victims: (i) they only apply to corporations (i.e. 
juridical persons) and (ii) they must involve TNCs domiciled in a country where the rule of law is, 
arguably, stronger than the host country (where the company or its subsidiaries operate). This does 
not correspond to the empirical evidence that we have collected where 43% of cases collected in the 
CATJ involve domestic companies or where individuals and not corporations are involved (such as the 
60% of cases in Colombia). The existing efforts to ensure extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the 
nationality of the TNC (e.g. ATS and recent legislation in France), needs to be expanded to include 
explicit support for the use of universal jurisdiction principle.  
The treaty would further the purposes of TJ by ordering states to issue regulation that 
facilitates legal proceedings in foreign countries and extraterritorial responsibility for TNCs. Such a 
system should include the obligation of the states to ensure that TNCs based in their territory refrain 
from violating human rights in other countries, as well as implement effective measures of access to 
justice in its territory for victims of violations of human rights committed by these TNCs in the 
territory of other states. It would also encourage states to explicitly allow for universal jurisdiction in 
cases of grave violations to human rights by businesses. 
3.6  MONITORING AND SUPERV ISORY BODY  
Existing global and regional human rights instruments provide for the creation of monitoring 
and supervisory mechanisms to support states to implement human rights obligations. Such 
mechanisms play a crucial role to advance accountability as they might require states to report 
periodically on their progress to implement their obligations, and hear individual petitions against 
both states and individuals. 
In TJ contexts, these mechanisms have not only brought accountability at the international 
level but also contributed to building the appropriate circumstances for domestic accountability.  
Four factors have been used in a multidimensional approach to explain the capacity to overcome 
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impunity in TJ: international pressure, civil society mobilization, judicial leadership, and weak veto 
players (Lessa, Payne, and Pereira 2015). While each factor plays a key functional role in overcoming 
impunity, no single factor is sufficient to bring about pathways to accountability (Lessa et al. 2015). 
In that regard, international pressure on states to comply with human rights obligations in TJ context 
has proved instrumental in domestically holding perpetrators of human rights violations accountable 
in the aftermath of dictatorships and armed conflict even where amnesty laws protected them. 
Traditionally, international pressure is exerted through the enforcement of clear state obligations by 
international bodies. According to this approach, international pressure that empowers local actors 
promotes new legal standards and sets specific obligations on states to end patterns of impunity for 
gross violations of human rights. Therefore, the effective use of domestic judicial and non-judicial TJ 
mechanism requires the existence of international bodies able to exert international pressure on 
states.  
In Colombia, the presence of global actors as part of the efforts to seek prosecution and 
remedy in cases of corporate complicity was determinant for successful outcomes. In the CATJ-
Colombia dataset, these actors are present in 48 per cent of cases with prosecution, and in 75 per 
cent of cases with remedy outcomes, and global actors were present in all cases where remedy was 
possible. Also, predicted probabilities tables show the salient role of global actors and the pressures 
that they exert on the state to increase the probabilities of prosecution of corporations (Bernal 
Bermúdez n.d.)   
Although some TJ mechanisms have addressed corporate complicity in different countries, 
very little has been achieved in terms of accountability, as the evidence in CATJ databze suggests. As 
Payne and Pereira (Payne and Pereira 2016) discuss, the absence of international pressures and the 
strength of veto players might account for such a record. In the CATJ-Colombia dataset, in only 4% of 
the cases did global actors like INGOs, intergovernmental organisations or other state agents, have 
an active role in supporting the claimants’ pursuit of truth and justice (Bernal Bermúdez n.d.). The 
current soft law nature of business and human rights international law has proven not to be enough 
to promote domestic business accountability. Similarly, international criminal law bodies have 
marginally addressed criminal business complicity of either companies or individuals31.  
The elaboration of the binding instrument is an opportunity to create a global monitoring and 
supervisory body able to exert international pressure to promote domestic business accountability. 
It is crucial to decide whether such an international body would have jurisdiction over states, 
companies, or both. Also, discussions need to take place on whether such a body will have powers 
only to monitor states, hear individual cases, mediate conflicts between parties, or a combination of 
all these alternatives. Although the discussion about all these issues go beyond the scope of this work, 
we bring the attention to the need of creating a monitoring body to promote accountability at the 
international level but also, and more importantly, at the domestic level. 
                                                                
31 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Statutes of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have provisions that unequivocally declare that these tribunals have 
jurisdiction only over natural persons. Where these courts have heard corporate complicity cases, individual employees and 
not the companies have faced accountability. This is the case for ICTR’s media case (Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean Bosco 
Barayagwiza of Radio T´ el´evision Libre des Mille Collines; Hassan Ngeze of the Kangura newsletter), the Mugonero incident 
trial (Elizaphan and G´erard Ntakirutimana), and the Gisovu Tea Factory trial (Alfred Musema). 
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4. CONCLUSION 
In the current context of TJ, a victims gap and accountability gap exists regarding the 
involvement of economic actors in the human rights violations of authoritarian regimes and armed 
conflicts. This is a gap that has been recognized in the business and human rights studies. Although 
victims face human rights violations perpetrated by businesses or businesses in collaboration with 
states or armed non-state actors, the absence of a clear and binding human rights instrument for 
redress of these crimes has led to a lack of redress. That failure to address the international rights of 
victims to truth, justice, and reparations for gross violations of human rights is inconsistent with the 
goals of TJ and the goals of universal international human rights instruments.  
The CATJ reveals important initiatives that some advocates of victims’ rights in some 
countries have been able to implement to fill these gaps. They have done so against all odds. They 
have overcome the very strong business veto over these judgements. They have also used innovative 
ways of blending international human rights principles found in domestic law. However, the extent 
to which other advocates in courts in other countries might use these precedents and interpret 
international and domestic law in such a way to overcome the business veto and fill the victims’ and 
accountability gap remains unclear. 
A binding agreement would advance these efforts by providing the international instrument 
and pressure to enforce it. The binding agreement would not only hold businesses accountable for 
contemporary human rights violations, it could get at the root causes of impunity that has 
perpetuated corporate complicity in authoritarian and conflict situations. The binding agreement 
thus advances the possibility of fulfilling TJ goals and filling gaps in addressing victims’ rights to truth, 
justice, and reparations.  
This paper has used empirical findings from the CATJ to show the role a treaty on business 
and human rights could play in these TJ goals that also promote the rights of victims in non-TJ 
environments. It thus merges the two – business and human rights and TJ literatures – in searching 
for solutions to the victims and accountability gap that exists where economic actors have been 
involved in the perpetration of human rights violations. We have proposed six elements crucial to that 
process. First, judicial accountability and access to justice fills victims’ rights to justice. Second, non-
judicial forms of accountability address victims’ right to truth. Third, by including all -- domestic and 
transnational – economic actors, victims’ universal rights are satisfied. Fourth, collective reparations 
guarantee that not only individuals but targeted groups and communities have access to redress. 
Fifth, by recognizing the responsibility of courts in every country to uphold universal rights of victims 
of human rights violations, a binding agreement would close jurisdictional loopholes used by 
companies to escape accountability. Sixth, by monitoring the outcomes of these efforts, the 
international community demonstrates the seriousness of closing the victims’ and accountability gap 
and sends a clear message to businesses of their responsibility to respect human rights wherever they 
operate.  
 
 
 
 
Can a treaty on business and human rights help achieve transitional justice goals? 22 
 
Homa Publica - Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos e Empresas | 2526-0774 | Vol. 01 Nº 02 | Jan-Jun 2017 | e:017 
REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS | REFERENCES | REFERENCIAS 
 
 
ABRAHAMS, Charles P. Lessons from the South African Experience. In Corporate Accountability in the 
Context of Transitional Justice, edited by Sabine Michalowski. New York: Routledge. 2013 
 
ANON. n.d. International Center for Transitional Justice. Retrieved February 22, 2017 
(<https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice>). 
 
BERNAL BERMÚDEZ, Laura. The Power of Corporations and the Power of People: Understanding 
Remedy and Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations. Colombia 2000-2014. University of 
Oxford. 
 
BERNAZ, Nadia. Business and Human Rights History, Law and Policy - Bridging the Accountability Gap. 
New York: Routledge. 2017. 
 
BOHOSLAVSKY, Juan Pablo and Veerle Opgenhaffen. The Past and Present of Corporate Complicity : 
Financing the Argentinean Dictatorship. Harvard Human Rights Journal 23:157–203. 2010. 
 
CARRANZA, R. Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic 
Crimes? International Journal of Transitional Justice 2:310–30. 2008. 
 
CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA. Basta Ya: Colombia Memorias de Guerra Y Dignidad. 
Bogotá. Retrieved at 
<http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/descargas.html>. 2013. 
 
CLAPHAM, Andrew. Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2006. 
 
DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO. Resolución Defensorial No. 39 - Violación de Los Derechos Humanos Por 
Siembra de Palma Africana En Territorios Colectivos de Jiguamiandó Y Curvaradó - Chocó. (39):1–42. 
Retrieved at <http://defensoria.org.co/red/anexos/pdf/02/res/defensorial/defensorial39.pdf>. 
2005. 
 
DEVA, Surya. Scope of the Legally Binding Instrument to Address Human Rights Violations Related to 
Business Activities. Retrieved at <https://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/scope_of_treaty.pdf>. 
2017. 
 
GRAY, D. Devilry, Complicity and Greed: Transitional Justice and Odious Debt. Law and Contemporary 
Problems (70). 2007. 
 
HAYNER, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. Routledge. 2001. 
 
INTERNATIONAL COMISSION OF JURISTS. The Scope of a Legally Binding Instrument on Business and 
Human Rights: Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. Geneva. Retrieved at 
<http://icj2.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Global-ReportScopeBusinessTreaty-
2015.pdf>. 2015. 
 
JUZGADO QUINTO PENAL DEL CIRCUITO ESPECIALIZADO DE MEDELLIN. Sentencia Condenatoria Y 
Absolutoria. 2014. 
 
LESSA, Francesca, Leigh A. Payne, and Gabriel Pereira. Overcoming Barriers to Justice in the Age of 
Human Rights Accountability. Human Rights Quarterly 27:728–754. 2015. 
 
LIM, Alwyn and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. Globalization and Commitment in Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Cross-National Analyses of Institutional and Political-Economy Effects. American Sociological Review 
77(1):69–98. Retrieved at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23102579>. 2012. 
 
MAASSARANI, Tarek F. Four Counts of Corporate Complicity: Alternative Forms of Accomplice Liability 
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act. New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 39–65. 
2005. 
 
Can a treaty on business and human rights help achieve transitional justice goals? 23 
 
Homa Publica - Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos e Empresas | 2526-0774 | Vol. 01 Nº 02 | Jan-Jun 2017 | e:017 
MICHALOWSKI, Sabine. Corporate Accountability in the Context of Transitional Justice. New York: 
Routledge. 2013. 
 
OXFORD PRO BONO PÚBLICO. Obstacles to Justice and Redress for Victims of Corporate Human Rights 
Abuse. Oxford. 2008. 
 
PATERSON, Pat. Transitional Justice in Colombia: Amnesty, Accountability and the Truth Commission. 
2016. 
 
PAUL, Geneviere and Judith Schönsteiner. Transitional Justice in the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights. Pp. 73–92 in Corporate Accountability in the Context of Transitional Justice, edited 
by Sabine Michalowski. New York: Routledge. 2013. 
 
PAYNE, Leigh A. and Gabriel Pereira. Accountability for Corporate Complicity in Human Rights 
Violations: Argentina’s Transitional Justice Innovation. In Outstanding Debts to Settle: The Economic 
Accomplices of the Dictatorship in Argentina, edited by Horacio Verbitsky and Juan Pablo 
Bohoslavsky. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2015. 
 
PAYNE, Leigh A. and Gabriel Pereira. Corporate Complicity in International Human Rights Violations. 
Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences 12. 2016. 
 
PAYNE, Leigh A. and Gabriel Pereira. The Business End of Human Rights during Dictatorships and Armed 
Conflict: New Accountability Challenges for Transitional Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 2018 
 
ROHT-ARRIAZA, Naomi. Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas. Hastings International & Comparative 
Law Review 27(157). Retrieved at <http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/691>. 2004. 
 
ROHT-ARRIAZA, Naomi and Katharine Orlovsky. A Complementary Relationship: Reparations and 
Development. in Transitional Justice Handbook for Latin America, edited by Fe ́lix Rea ́tegui. ICTJ. 2011. 
 
ROHT-ARRIAZA, N. and K. Orlovsky. A Complementary Relationship: Reparations and Development. Pp. 
170–213 in Transitional Justice and Development. Making Connections, edited by Pablo de Greiff and 
R. Duthie. New York: Social Science Research Council. 2009. 
 
RUGGIE, John Gerard. Just Business : Multinational Corporations and Human Rights. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company. 2013. 
 
SÁNCHEZ, Nelson Camilo. Corporate Accountability, Reparations, and Distributive Justice in Post-
Conflict Societies. Pp. 114–30 in Corporate Accountability in the Context of Transitional Justice. New 
York: Routledge. 2013. 
 
SECRETARY GENERAL. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. 
New York. 2004. 
 
TEITEL, Ruti G. Transitional Justice Genealogy. Harvard Human Rights Journal 69. 2003. 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSNITIONAL JUSTICE. Truth Commissions. n.d. 
 
UN GLOBAL COMPACT. UN Global Compact. Retrieved at 
<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/abouttheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html>. 2000. 
 
UNITED NATIONS. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Retrieved at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf>. 2011. 
 
UNITED NATIONS SUB-COMISSION ON THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights. 2003. 
 
VAN ZYL, Paul. Promoting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies. in Transitional Justice 
Handbook for Latin America, edited by Fe ́lix Reátegui. Brasilia and New York: ICTJ. 2011. 
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